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Abstract 
Abstract: In April 2014, a work of art, titled Spy Booth, by the artist Banksy, was painted on 
the outside wall of a house in Cheltenham. For several months, the conundrum of its 
ownership evolved in the media until it was eventually granted listed building status by the 
local planning authority, Cheltenham Borough Council. Despite this apparent resolution, the 
situation gives rise to a number of important questions concerning the nature of ownership 
and its limitations, which will be considered in this article. Ultimately, it transpires that 
property law necessarily fails in the protection of public art, but that a retrospective 
condoning of transgressive behaviour is nevertheless an important aspect of the law’s role in 
controlling behaviour.   
KEYWORDS: Land Law; Property; Planning; Ownership; Transgression; Graffiti; Banksy; 
Street art 
 
Banksy is a graffiti artist whose stencilled artworks have appeared in a number of 
locations across the world. Many of Banksy’s works have become landmarks in themselves, 
with the images of two male police officers kissing each other (Kissing Cops, Brighton), and 
a naked man dangling from a window ledge while a man and a woman look out of the 
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window above him (Naked Man, Bristol) have become recognisable motifs in popular 
culture. Owning an artwork by Banksy has developed a certain cachet. Paintings have been 
sold to collectors, prices have increased, but so too have acts of vandalism.  
 The law then becomes involved, as appeals are made to it to protect the work from the 
acts of vandals (through the use of criminal law and torts, and also through the use of 
planning law) and from the rival claims made by others (using the law of contract and public 
and private property law). The question for the academic lawyer therefore is what type of 
protection is offered and whether it is adequate, especially in the context of street art where 
the artist retains little or no control over the work once it is exposed to the weather and the 
intervention of vandals, at the same time as being made with a view to generating a public 
response. Although much has been written (particularly in the US) on graffiti art as freedom 
of expression (Gee,2 Welch3), copyright and the reproduction of public art (Rychlicki4 
Roundtree5) and the cultural biases in determining something is art or vandalism (Bird6), what 
this article posits is that the disputes that arose as a result of a recent work by Banksy, titled 
Spy Booth, emphasize that the law’s response is predicated upon the notion of art as a 
commodity and that the law’s emphasis on classifying things of value as property means that 
the public good is lost. Furthermore, the measures that are available within the law in order to 
protect Spy Booth from damage or removal are ultimately passive and insufficiently 
interventionist in character, but that the law also creates the space for graffiti art to be made, 
                                                          
2 E.G.Gee ‘City walls can speak: the street art movement and graffiti’s place in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.’ (2013) 20(1) The Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal 209 
3 K. Welch ‘Graffiti and the constitution: a first amendment analysis of the Los Angeles tagging crew 
injunction’ (2011) 85(1) Southern Calfornia Law Review 205. 
4 T. Rychlick. ‘Legal questions about illegal art.’ (2008) 3(6) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 
393. 
5 A. Roundtree  Graffiti artists “get up” in intellectual property’s negative space 1 (2013) 31 Cardozo Arts and 
Entertainments Law Journal 959. 
6 S. Bird. ‘Aesthetics, Authority and the Outlaw of the Streets.’ (2009) 3(3) Public Space: the Journal of Law 
and Social Justice 1 . 
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and that despite the mismatch between an artistic and a legal evaluation of art, they are 
ultimately mutually sustaining.  
This article considers the problematic and incomplete nature of the law’s response to 
a recent and controversial example of street art made by Banksy and compares this with how 
street art is justified from an artistic point of view, which is often at odds with the law’s 
approach. It then addresses how law and art interplay and to consider the extent to which this 
tumultuous relationship invigorates both disciplines.  
 
1. Spy Booth –  outline of a painting 
Spy Booth appeared on a wall in Cheltenham in April 2014 – the side wall of 159 Fairview 
Road.  It depicted three people dressed as archetypal spies. They have been stencilled onto 
the wall in such a way that they surround a public telephone kiosk situated in front of the 
wall. The composite image therefore is one of three spies intercepting a telephone call. One 
stands to the left of the telephone kiosk with recording equipment; another is placing a 
satellite on the roof of the kiosk, while the third kneels, listening through headphones to the 
conversation taking place in the telephone kiosk. Two problems arose following the 
appearance of the painting. The first was whether it could remain where it had been painted 
and the second was how it could be protected from weather and from vandalism.  
These disputes arose because soon after the work first appeared, a collector expressed 
an interest in buying the work and removing it to his home in the United States. Meanwhile, 
people of Cheltenham wanted the work to remain in its original location, and a fund-raising 
campaign was set up to allow for the painting to be bought for the people of Cheltenham. 
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Thereafter, two local authorities, Cheltenham Borough Council and Gloucestershire County 
Council became involved in the dispute, and it was also suggested that the Department of 
Transport could have a claim over it.  
Throughout the summer of 2014, the disputes continued, until in August, the work 
was defaced by being partially covered in spray paint. After that, there were discussions 
concerning whether it is possible to repair the work, and also whether the wall upon which it 
has been painted is safe.  Ultimately, in March 2015, Spy Booth was listed by Cheltenham 
Borough Council as a listed building, with work now underway to restore it to its original 
state. In this situation, the appeal to the law is twofold. Firstly, any decision regarding the 
future location of Spy Booth depends on a decision as to its ownership, and once that is 
resolved, there is an appeal to the law to resolve the question of stewardship – in other words, 
the protection of Spy Booth from damage. In both cases, as will be demonstrated, the law’s 
response has been somewhat problematic, and prima facie, unsatisfactory.   
 
2. Spy Booth and the question of ownership 
In law, the question of where an object is placed and whether is remains there depends 
largely on who owns the object and who owns the place. Thus, the surface upon which the 
artwork is painted is privileged over the artwork itself, and ownership of real property is 
privileged over ownership of chattels. The concepts of possession and control in law indicate 
that it is the owner who has the best right to determine this because the person in possession 
of a thing is entitled to ‘to exclude strangers from interfering with the property’.7 In the Spy 
                                                          
7 Per Sir Henry Duke, The Tubantia [1924] P 78. 
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Booth scenario however, the difficulty was that five different entities could lay claim to 
ownership, but each claimant would have a different objective regarding the future location 
of Spy Booth, with those with the greatest claim to ownership having the least interest in 
preserving the public character of the work because they are able to imbue it with a financial 
value and a privately motivated cachet of being able to exclude all others. On the other hand, 
those with only a moral claim over it, having the most to gain from it being allowed to remain 
in its original location. What follows therefore is an analysis of these competing claims and 
an explanation of why the law privileges commodification over appreciation.  
 
3. Banksy’s claim to Spy Booth 
a. copyright 
The first possible claimant is of course Banksy, who claims ownership as the maker of the 
artwork. In intellectual property law, there is no doubt that Banksy owns the moral claim to 
Spy Booth, that is, the right to be identified as its originator. Although Davies8 and Rychlicki9 
emphasize the role of copyright law in relation to the scope for others to reproduce the work, 
the issue for the purposes of this article is rather, whether Banksy is able to use the law of 
copyright to prevent the work from being damaged or removed. Banksy is entitled under the 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 both to be identified as the author of the work (s77) 
and to object to any derogatory treatment of the work (s80). Banksy’s authorship of Spy 
Booth has never been in dispute – nobody else has claimed to have been the artist who 
painted Spy Booth.  However, the claim of the artist does not suffice to enable Banksy 
                                                          
8 J. Davies. ‘Art Crimes? Theoretical perspectives on copyright protection for illegally created graffiti 
art.’(2012-13) 65(1) Maine Law Review 28.  
9 T. Rychlicki,. ‘Legal questions about illegal art.’ (2008) 3(6) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and 
Practice 393.  
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prevent the removal of Spy Booth from the public space. A case could be made however for 
arguing that the removal of Spy Booth could constitute derogatory treatment. 
Banksy may argue for example that that interfering with the work damages its artistic 
integrity. Firstly, it may be argued, very cogently, that Spy Booth is context specific. A 
stencilled picture of three spies is not in itself a work of art. The artistry comes from the 
context in which the work has been done because its impact depends on its location – Banksy 
has made this artwork in Cheltenham precisely because Cheltenham is where GCHQ’s 
headquarters is situated. Accordingly removing Spy Booth from its current location could be 
said to damage the artistic statement and interferes with the integrity of the work contrary to 
s80, which provides that the author is entitled to object to ‘any addition to, deletion from, or 
alteration to or adaptation of the work’.  
Banksy would therefore have to demonstrate that removal constitutes a distortion or 
mutilation of the artwork – or that it is subject to conduct that ‘is otherwise prejudicial to the 
honour or reputation of the author.’ In the case of Delves Broughton v House of Harlot Ltd 
[2012] EWPCC 29, simply cropping a photograph that had been taken by the claimant so as 
to exclude the background was enough of a distortion to class as derogatory treatment, 
although it was material in this case that the claimant had not consented to the use of the 
photograph of the defendant’s website. In the case of Confetti Records v Warner Music UK 
Ltd [2003] EWHC 1274 (Ch) on the other hand, it was made clear that the distortion or 
mutilation itself had to be prejudicial to the claimant, and not merely a distortion or a 
mutilation per se. This case concerned a music track composed by the claimant, which was 
overlaid by another artist with lyrics that made reference to violence and drug use. Lewison J 
concluded that the lack of evidence regarding the prejudicial effect of the treatment on the 
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composer of the track, was indicative of the fact that although the original track had been 
used, its use was not prejudicial to the honour of the claimant. He states (at para 150):  
 
I hold that the mere fact that a work has been distorted or mutilated gives rise to no 
claim, unless the distortion or mutilation prejudices the author's honour or 
reputation. 
 
If the latter case is followed therefore, it would appears that Banksy’s best claim is to argue 
that any attempt to sell Spy Booth is prejudicial to the artist’s reputation as an egalitarian 
artist or secondly that measures taken to protect Spy Booth contradict the emphasis the artist 
places on the accessibility of art. Yet, there are problems with this argument because the fact 
that others may later sell the work and remove it may be seen to emphasize, rather than 
detract, from Banksy’s significance in terms of making art in publicly accessible spaces. The 
commodification and sale of a work such as Spy Booth means that Banksy is able to highlight 
the injustice that arises from the fact that the artist derives no financial benefit from the sale, 
and that a public work of art has been privatized by the greed of others.  Furthermore, the fact 
– or at least the likelihood - that Spy Booth was made on the wall of 159 Fairview Road 
without the consent of the owners means that Banksy should have at least some expectation 
that the painting could be removed by overpainting if the owners of the house objected to it – 
there should therefore be an expectation by Banksy that the work will be deleted. To argue 
therefore that a removal of Spy Booth constitutes a derogatory treatment for the purposes of 
copyright law is not therefore a particularly strong justification for it to be maintained in 
public view. 
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Another difficulty in terms of Banksy’s entitlement to control future access to Spy Booth 
by the public is that where derogatory treatment is proved, the appropriate remedy is an 
injunction. In the Spy Booth situation, there is nothing to which the injunction can attach 
because Banksy cannot prohibit the use of another’s land. Damages in lieu of an injunction 
are often also nominal in most cases – the claimant in Delves-Broughton v House of Harlot 
Ltd was only awarded £50 in respect of the derogatory treatment of her work. Accordingly, 
the law of copyright does not protect it adequately as a public work of art,10 and neither does 
it give the artist sufficient control of the artwork to ensure that it remains in its original 
location.  
 
b. Trespass, conversion and theft 
The law’s inability to protect Banksy’s entitlement to maintain the integrity of the artistic 
statement of the artwork is also manifested by the fact that Banksy is also prevented from 
using other forms of legal action aimed at the protection of goods. Banksy cannot sue under 
the torts of trespass or conversion, and neither is the artist the victim of the crime of theft 
because the artist does not own something whose integrity has been infringed, by the fact that 
the artist is no longer in possession of the artwork.11 The analogy here is the hotel guest who 
is unable to argue that he or she has been the victim of burglary or trespass because a licensee 
does not have a sufficient interest in the land to be a victim of trespass by virtue of not being 
in possession of the land.12 By the same principle, Banksy does not have a sufficient 
entitlement in the surface upon which Spy Booth was painted to argue that the removal 
                                                          
10 G.M. Barnett ‘Recognized stature: protecting street art as cultural property.’ (2013) 12(2) Chicago Kent 
Journal of Intellectual Property 204.  
11  Smith v Milles (1786) 1 Term Rep 475 
12 Roberts v Swangrove Estates [2008] EWCA Civ 98. 
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constitutes trespass, conversion, or theft. Furthermore, although the act of selling the painting 
would ordinarily constitute theft or conversion, for neither of these actions is Banksy the 
victim. No property owned by the artist has been damaged, and therefore the artist lacks the 
appropriate proximity to the property to be able to be involved in legal proceedings of this 
nature, because the law of property defends the place of the offence in this context but fails to 
protect the thing that is stolen.  
Therefore, although one might instinctively defend Banksy’s entitlement to ensure 
that Spy Booth remains true to the original artistic intention, thus indicating one key failure of 
the law is that an artist cannot defend his or her work when it is made in a public space.  
 
4. The owners of 159 Fairview Road’s claim to Spy Booth 
The second possible claimants to the ownership of Spy Booth are the owners of 159 Fairview 
Road. In relation to their claim to ownership, the law’s involvement depends heavily on the 
foreknowledge or otherwise of the fact that Spy Booth would be painted on the wall of their 
house. If they consented to the work being painted on their wall, there is no difficulty in 
concluding that Spy Booth as become affixed to the land13 and accrues to the owners of that 
land as a fixture.  
The difficulty with Spy Booth of course is that although Banksy intended for the work 
to become part of the land, the landowner may have had no such intention, and is unlikely to 
have consented to Banksy’s intervention. The owners are therefore entitled to object to Spy 
                                                          
13 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 
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Booth and bring actions in trespass or to complain of criminal damage contrary to s1 of the 
Criminal Damage Act 1971.14   
In reality, the enhanced value of their property means that the owners of 159 Fairview 
Road are unlikely to complain in this way and are likely to form a retrospective intention that 
the artwork has become part of the land. The analogy would be here would be with the 
homeowner who pays a professional plumber or builder to install a fixture onto the land, or 
the homeowner who acquires a plot of land and decides to retain some of the fixtures 
installed by a previous owner or tenant. Thus, the recent case of The Creative Foundation v 
Dreamland Leisure Limited [2015] EWHC 2556 (Ch) also involving an artwork by Banksy, 
this time in Folkestone, concluded that the artwork by Banksy belonged to the landlord, and 
that the tenant of the land upon which the work was painted could not remove it from its 
location.  They themselves may not have been instrumental in the decision to attach the 
fixture, but may nevertheless decide to acquire ownership of the fixture once it has been 
attached and they have made the decision not to have it removed. 
Nevertheless, if the owners of 159 Fairview Road allow Spy Booth to remain, a 
number of consequences, both positive and negative arise. As owners, they may derive the 
benefit of the commodity value of Spy Booth - their home’s value being increased, and they 
are able to sell Spy Booth if they wish. Their entitlement to the commodity value of a work 
such as Spy Booth therefore exceeds the entitlement of the artist They are also entitled to 
conclude that they do not like the painting and thus to have the wall painted over. 
Accordingly, they have a significant entitlement in property law to Spy Booth, but this 
entitlement conflicts both with the artist’s entitlement (not to have the work damaged or 
                                                          
14 I. Edwards “Banksy’s graffiti: a not so simple case of criminal damage?” (2009) 73 Journal of Criminal Law 
345.  
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mutilated), and the public interest in Spy Booth, discussed below. The owners of 159 
Fairview Road have the benefits of ownership, but they do not acquire any responsibility over 
Spy Booth, and acquire no obligation to protect its character as a work of public art. This 
therefore is the second failure of the law – an owner may benefit from the work but may also 
destroy it or prevent access to it by others. 
The third failure is manifested by the fact that even if the owners of 159 Fairview 
Road wished to maintain its public character, this may be curtailed by the law in a situation 
analogous to that described by Mettler15where a landowner may like the artwork but the 
prosecuting authorities in the United States do not. In the Spy Booth scenario, the owners of 
159 Fairview Road will be liable for making alterations to the building without having 
obtained the necessary consents under the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation) Act 
1990. 159 Fairview Road is a Grade II listed building for the purposes of s9 of this Act, and 
therefore any alteration to the building requires permission under s7 of that Act, which states 
that authorisation is required in respect of any work, alteration of extension to a listed 
building. According to the cases of Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v 
Secretary of State for the Environment (1987) 86 LGR 402 and Newport Borough Council 
[2003] JPL 267, repainting (which in a sense is what Spy Booth is) could class as an 
alteration, and therefore a criminal offence under s9 unless it can be established that works to 
the building were urgently necessary in the interests of safety or health or for the preservation 
of the building, something that is of course unlikely to be demonstrated in relation to the 
painting of a trio of spies.  
                                                          
15 M. Mettler. Graffiti museum: a First Amendment argument for protecting uncommissioned art on private 
property (2012) 111(2) Michigan Law Review 249. 
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The third failure of the law is therefore that although our instinctive response is that 
art should be for all to enjoy, and that Spy Booth is an art work of considerable merit, the 
owners of 159 Fairview Road may be punished for recognising this because their home’s 
listed building status results in Spy booth being categorized an unauthorized and criminal 
alteration, rather than as a work of art, and an unplanned but positive enhancement to a 
building and a locality is criminalised rather than commended. Indeed if the approach taken 
in The Creative Foundation v Dreamland Leisure Limited [2015] EWHC 2556 (Ch) is 
adopted more widely, there may be increasing calls for the owners of land upon which an 
artwork is painted to remove the work, because of fears that it may attract further graffiti. The 
Spy Booth scenario is an example of this in operation – after the work had been made, it was 
then damaged by being painted over with spray paint. 
 
5. Gloucestershire County Council’s and the Department of Transport’s claims to Spy 
Booth 
Gloucestershire County Council also became involved in the dispute because the wall upon 
which Spy Booth was painted adjoins two streets - Fairview Road and Hewlett Road. The 
address of the house is 159 Fairview Road, but Spy Booth has been painted on the side wall, 
which is in Hewlett Road. Two local authorities were involved because it was alleged that the 
wall was, until the 1960s, a party wall between two properties – 159 Fairview Road, and 
another property, 64 Hewlett Road, which was bought by, and demolished by Gloucestershire 
County Council in the 1960s. If Gloucestershire County Council still owns the land in 
Hewlett Road, then it may be argued that the boundary between 159 Fairview Road and its 
former neighbour is the middle line of the wall according to the common law the ad medium 
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filium rule. If so, then Spy Booth is not in Fairview Road at all – it is in Hewlett Road, and on 
Gloucestershire County Council’s side of the boundary line. In a news report, Gloucestershire 
County Council denied having any claim to the party wall16 but some weeks later, it was 
alleged that the party wall belongs not to Gloucestershire County Council, but to the 
Department of Transport17 who may wish to assert its claim to ownership over the wall – 
especially given its recently enhanced value. 
There may be many advantages to Spy Booth being identified as belonging to the 
local authority, as they may be in a strong position to ensure that the painting remains in 
Cheltenham, as well as ensuring that the artwork is not damaged – either through litigation in 
private law, being a complainant in prosecutions for criminal damage, or by using public law 
to ensure that the artwork is protected as a listed building. However, the commodification of 
Spy Booth by the state may be regarded as objectionable – for fifty years, the relevant public 
authorities have not expressed any claim to ownership of the wall, and therefore to assert 
ownership now that the wall has acquired additional value may be viewed as extremely unfair 
to the owners of 159 Fairview Road, and an objectionable use of a local authority powers, as 
it is the owners of 159 Fairview Road who have borne the burden of maintaining the wall for 
50 years, and who should therefore derive the benefit of the wall now that its value has been 
enhanced. It is conceded however that the local authority and the Department of Transport’s 
claims are weak. It is probable that any determination either by a court or by the Land 
Registrar using the s60 procedure under the Land Registration Act 200218 regarding where 
the boundary should now be would conclude that the wall belongs in its entirety to the 
                                                          
16 BBC “Banksy’s Spy Booth: Stop notice could be issued.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
gloucestershire-28070553 28 June, 2014. Site accessed 5 June 2015. 
17 BBC “Cheltenham Banksy Artwork ‘Belongs to the Government.’” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
gloucestershire-28449693 25 July, 2014. Site accessed 5 June 2015.  
18 Land Registration Act 2002.  
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owners of 159 Fairview Road both though long use and in terms of the practicality for them 
of maintaining the wall.  However, the fourth failure of the law arises from the possible 
entitlement of an unexpected party to Spy Booth, and the fact that this could be upheld over 
and above the entitlement of those with a more immediate claim to the land. The fact that the 
law could entertain new claims to ownership once a benefit has been identified, while 
allowing a putative owner to ignore responsibility when ownership is solely a burden creates 
a system that fosters disputes over financial worth rather than facilitating the adoption and 
protection of something that was created as being for the benefit of the public and recognized 
by the public as such.  
 
6. The art collector 
The fourth person laying a claim to Spy Booth is the art collector who wished to by the 
artwork. If a buyer purchased it, the question of what they acquire then becomes pertinent. If 
the work may be removed while leaving the wall intact, then there should be no difficulty in 
transferring ownership of the painting from the seller to the buyer, much as one could transfer 
ownership of a painting made on canvas -indeed ownership of some of Banksy’s other works 
have been transferred in this way.19 This means however that an art collector is well placed to 
remove Spy Booth from public view, and the art collector’s entitlement, in the event that 
removing Spy Booth from its current location is possible and/or desired defeats both the 
claim of the public and the claim of the artist to the integrity of the artwork. Nevertheless, the 
weakness of these parties in law, whatever the strength of their moral claim means that the art 
                                                          
19 A. Topping “Brighton kisses goodbye to Brighton’s kissing coppers.” 21 April, 2011 
‘http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2011/apr/21/banksy-kissing-copppers-sold-america 
Site accessed 5 June 2015.  
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collector who is able to pay money acquires possession of an artwork and is therefore entitled 
to exclude all others from the enjoyment of the work. The law’s framing of the concept of 
ownership in monetary terms, based on the contractual acquisition of goods for financial 
consideration means that those who are able to frame their entitlement in this way are better 
protected by the law than those whose claim makes no appeal to quantifiable gain.  
It is possible however that Spy Booth cannot be removed, and in this situation, its 
ownership will depend upon who is responsible for the maintenance of the wall and where 
the boundary will lie. Three possibilities arise here. Firstly, the wall may belong in its entirety 
either to 159 Fairview Road or to the buyer of Spy Booth, and whoever owns the wall owns 
the painting. If the buyer acquires the wall, then his situation mirrors that of the owners of 
159 Fairview Road, discussed above, as the buyer is entitled to paint over the artwork or 
leave it in situ as he or she chooses, but being subject to the obligations imposed by the local 
authority in terms of listed building consents. 
If title to the wall is retained by the owners of 159 Fairview Road, their acts may 
damage the artwork, and they have no obligation to undertake repairs unless an action may be 
sustained in trespass or nuisance. 20  However, the neighbour is not liable for the natural wear 
and tear to the wall. This may be problematic for the buyer of Spy Booth if he or she acquires 
the painting, but not the wall because it means that there will be no liability on the part of the 
owners of 159 Fairview Road if the wall is damaged through no fault on their part. 
This may be mitigated to some extent by the imposition of an obligation to repair. For 
example, an obligation to maintain may be included within the contract of sale, but it is well 
                                                          
20 Jones v Pritchard [1908] 1 Ch. 630  
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accepted that the burden of positive covenants cannot run,21 and therefore when the wall is 
sold on, unless a chain of covenants can be agreed, there can be no obligation to repair once 
159 Fairview Road is sold. Accordingly, Spy Booth is extremely vulnerable to damage by 
neglect in the situation where ownership of the wall and ownership of the artwork are 
divided.  
The third possibility is that, if ownership of the wall is shared between the owner of 
159 Fairview Road and the owner of Spy Booth, then the wall in this situation is a party wall 
for the purposes of the Party Wall Act 1996 and the cost of effecting such repairs is to be 
borne by both parties. This has the advantage of ensuring that Spy Booth is maintained, 
although the enforcement of such obligations is often problematic in practice if one part 
cannot- or will not – fulfil their obligations. Again the law’s intervention is well-intentioned, 
but ultimately unsuited to a situation such as Spy Booth. On the one hand it defends the rights 
of the person whose claim to ownership is based on acquisition pursuant to contract, and the 
consequent privatisation of the commodity, but simultaneously, the law fails to protect the 
notion that the maintenance of Spy Booth rests on the responsibility of neighbours to 
maintain the adjacent space. 
The buyer’s entitlement to a work such as Spy Booth is ultimately extremely 
problematic. The buyer who is able to afford to buy the painting is able to undermine the 
value of Spy Booth as art. By removing the piece from its location in Cheltenham, the buyer 
is able to decontextualize the piece from the political comment it makes – and the public 
statement about the extent to which communications are monitored is therefore lost – the 
statement becomes one that is made behind closed doors. Purchasing Spy Booth also 
                                                          
21 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 Ac 310 
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undermines Banksy’s artistic purpose which was initially to make artwork that everyone 
could see rather than restricting it to the people who wish to visit art galleries – an artwork 
that makes a public statement ceases to be art if the opportunity for the public to respond to it 
is lost. Even if Spy Booth remains in situ, the buyer’s capacity to protect it from damage even 
by the current owners of 159 Fairview Road is limited, and is lost completely when the land 
is sold. Yet the law privileges the buyer’s entitlement – he is entitled to buy the artwork, and, 
having done so, is entitled to asset the owner’s right to remove, neglect or destroy without 
sanction. Again the apparent failure of the law is demonstrated. 
 
7. The local community 
The final group with a claim over Spy Booth are those who regard the painting as art, and 
who wish to enjoy it as such. Most immediately among these of course are the people who 
live and work in and around Cheltenham. Yet, although Spy Booth has very quickly become 
a local landmark, the social entitlement to Spy Booth is extremely limited.  The options 
available to the local people therefore were either to acquire Spy Booth themselves in order 
to decide, as owners, that it could remain where it was painted, or to use the mechanisms of 
public law in order to oppose its removal. The former objective was fulfilled by the 
establishment of a campaign group, which hoped to be able to buy Spy Booth. The objective 
of the campaign has been to ensure that Spy Booth was not removed, by outbidding the 
intended buyer.22 However, such an approach does not in reality allow Spy Booth to be 
owned by the community collectively. Instead, the aim of the campaign group was that Spy 
                                                          
22 BBC “Cheltenham Banksy ‘Spy Booth’ artwork damaged again.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-
gloucestershire-28753564 Site accessed 5 June 2015  
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Booth would be acquired by a group of local people, rather than by the town or the locality as 
a whole. Even though the outcome may have been the same in the short term, in the longer 
term, Spy Booth would have been under just as much risk of concealment or removal to 
another location because the new owners could have decided to exclude non-owners from 
being able to access the painting. Another failure of the law here therefore is that the law 
defends ownership by an individual or a small group rather than by a community collectively.  
Furthermore, although a higher bid for Spy Booth may be attractive to the owners of 
159 Fairview Road, the mere fact that there is another willing buyer does not mean that the 
sellers will be willing to sell to them, even if a higher price is offered – gazumping may be a 
perfectly legitimate practice, but for some sellers it carries the taint of moral repugnance.23 
This aspect of Spy Booth therefore depends on the law of contract and the identity of the 
eventual buyer. If the seller sells Spy Booth to the intended buyer, then the fact that there is 
an alternative buyer who is willing to buy Spy Booth with a view to ensuring that it remains 
in Cheltenham, is immaterial. In this case, any interest the local community has in relation to 
the painting is lost. Furthermore, the extent to which the public is able to oppose the removal 
of Spy Booth is limited to its ability to make representations to the local planning authority. 
Such representations will however be a. balanced against other material considerations – 
including the desire to protect a listed building; and b. will need to be framed with reference 
to material planning considerations as opposed to an instinctive appeal to emotion and an 
expression of a view that it is popular and well-liked, which irrespective of their truth, will 
not be permitted to influence the local planning authority’s decision.  
 
                                                          
23 G. Lightman “Trustees: moral duties and equitable accounting.” (2008) 1 Trusts Law International 11. 
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8. The dissatisfaction with ownership 
The fact that these competing entitlements to Spy Booth exist indicate that art is difficult to 
classify within existing concepts of ownership. There is not one clear owner, who is able to 
demonstrate that his or her claim trumps all others. Furthermore, the entitlements of an owner 
do not correlate with the perceived public benefit, because an owner of property is perfectly 
entitled to exclude all others from it, and to sell it for the highest price. On the other hand, 
those that have the strongest desire to maintain it as a public artwork, cannot prevent its 
removal from the public space.  
Also, what is seen in the Spy Booth situation is that the law does not provide a clear 
solution to the issue of ownership – the question of who owns Spy Booth receives a different 
response depending on whether the appeal is made to copyright (Banksy), to the law of 
contract (the Buyer) or to the principles of priority (the owners of 159 Fairview Road and the 
local authority). The law’s emphasis on property serves only the commodity status of art, 
while the preservation and public access imperative are greeted with little more than 
confusion. The concept of ownership, with its reliance on quantifying art in monetary terms 
and protecting it through the mechanisms of private responsibility is not therefore appropriate 
for a public work of art where a community benefit, coupled with a community responsibility 
is required. An individual owner is able to protect an artwork from criminal damage, but has 
a less clear motivation to maintain it for the public benefit because there is very little personal 
gain to be made from protecting the work from the inaction of adjoining landowners. Private 
notions of land ownership do not correlate therefore with the public character of the art. 
 
9. Spy Booth and planning law 
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A similar concern regarding the failure of the law arises when the law’s stewardship function 
is invoked in relation to the Spy Booth situation. Again the law is seen to intervene but in a 
way that has limited efficacy. 
 Although the public may respond to public consultation to any planning 
application made in respect of graffiti art, and, as in the case of Spy Booth, the importance of 
the artwork to the local community may be a factor24 in any decision made by the local 
authority in relation to work undertaken on Spy Booth.25 Graffiti art polarizes opinion and 
therefore the public response to planning consultations could also serve as just as much of a 
justification for the removal of Spy Booth as for its preservation. Furthermore, the response 
of the public to art in the context of planning law is expressed in terms of visual amenity and 
the character of the area26 rather than on the appreciation of Spy Booth as art. In essence, the 
public may acknowledge the artistry of Spy Booth, but not as an adornment for their street.   
Furthermore, the use of planning law as a means of protecting an art work suffers 
from being reactive rather than proactive. In March 2015, Spy Booth was listed under the 
Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, and although this ensures that 
it must remain on the wall of 159 Fairview Road rather than being sold, two key problems 
arise in relation to the use of listed building status as a means of protecting an artwork.  
Firstly, the circumstances in which Spy Booth was painted demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of the planning regime in the face of a situation where the law is disregarded. 
It must not be forgotten that prior to Spy Booth being painted, 159 Fairview Road was 
                                                          
24 R (on the application of Bizzy B Management Ltd) v Stockton-On-Tees Borough Council [2012] EWCA Civ 
228 
25 Stringer v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1971] 1 All ER 65 at 77 
26 Department for Communities and Local Government (2014) FQs Application Process  
http://www.planningportal.gov.uk/general/faq/faqapplyprocess 
Site accessed 5 June 2015.  
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already a listed building. Listed status did not protect the building from what could be 
regarded as an alteration, and it is probable that listed status will be equally ineffective in 
protecting Spy Booth from later acts that cause damage to it. Secondly, the fact that Spy 
Booth remained in its current location at all relied not on the local authority adopting positive 
measures to preserve it, but rather from a decision not to enforce the breach occasioned by 
the painting of Spy Booth, and the owners of 159 Fairview Road’s decision to accept the 
artwork as a form of enhancement of the house.  
Thirdly, the result of listing means that the responsibility for preserving Spy Booth as 
a form of public art is imposed on the owners of 159 Fairview Road, who may not necessarily 
be able to prevent the work from being damaged by weather or by vandalism. Agamben 
conceptualizes this as a situation of non-law where the absence of legal regulation legitimates 
the assertion of power27 by the legal system. In other words the law apportions responsibility 
on the individual in order to absolve social or collective responsibility, but once that 
responsibility has been attached, the law cannot, and does not ensure that the artwork is 
maintained. The individual cannot be forced to protect the artwork from its environment and 
cannot be forced to effect repairs to it unless its condition causes damage or nuisance. The 
law’s intervention is therefore limited in that the effectiveness of requiring someone to take 
responsibility is limited, and is only achieved at all by ascribing private responsibility for 
what is in reality a public benefit.  
 Again therefore, the law’s intervention is characterised by its failure rather 
than its success, and given that Spy Booth was damaged by vandalism, when a response was 
made by the law, it was too late to be effective. In light of this therefore, it becomes 
                                                          
27 G. Agamben. Homo-Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Redwood city, Stanford University Press, 1998. 
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necessary to consider whether the law has any other weapons in its armoury which will serve 
to protect a work such as Spy Booth as a form of public art.  However, although concepts of 
gift, trust, and commonality could be used more extensively to achieve the balance between 
protecting a work of art from being lost to public view or damaged and preserving its status 
as a public benefit, all of these factors have the flavour of property to them, and rely on art 
being a commodity.  
 
10. The law’s alternatives to ownership 
a. A public gift 
Let us first consider the possibility that Spy Booth could be regarded as a public gift. An 
artist may make the artwork but once made, it belongs to the public, who may decide on its 
fate. This has the advantage of ensuring that no-one is able to claim ownership of it, and 
therefore its sale or removal will be prevented. Nevertheless, the concept of a gift requires 
acceptance by the donee, and therefore the risk this creates is that any person may create such 
a gift, even though no recipient wishes to receive it. Also, the lack of an owner also means 
that no-one has a sufficient interest in preserving the artwork to give them the necessary 
impetus to object to any removal or damage to the artwork. It is also possible to argue that 
although the artwork was a public gift, the wall upon which it is painted was not, and 
therefore, the owners of 159 Fairview Road have a continued entitlement to object to the 
deployment of their wall for a purpose that they did not instigate. 
 Furthermore, public gifts are most commonly conferred through the medium of a 
charitable trust – a mechanism that tempers but does not entirely remove the notion of 
ownership, in that no one person derives the absolute benefits of ownership and the 
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commodity value cannot be accessed by an individual. However, the law of charities and 
trusts is problematic here again because the settlor (e.g. Banksy) has no title over the surface 
upon which the painting is made, while the owners of 159 Fairview Road have no intention 
that their wall, once it has been painted on should be maintained for the public benefit.  
Also, it would be undesirable if art – or more specifically the adjudication that something 
it art could be used as a catalyst for the transfer of an object such as a wall from private to 
public ownership. It is also anathematic to the concept of trusteeship that the office of a trust 
should be imposed without acceptance – or at least acquiescence on the part of the trustee.  
 
b. A gift to the owner 
An alternative possibility is that an artwork may be treated as a gift to the owner of the 
property for the time being. They cannot sell the artwork, although the artwork would 
increase the value of the property upon which the work has been painted. This was the 
approach adopted by another artist, Damien Hirst, whose spot paintings are accompanied by a 
certificate of ownership. Hirst’s painting, titled Bombay Mix was, like Spy Booth, also 
painted onto the wall of a house. Unlike Spy Booth however, Bombay Mix was painted onto 
the internal wall of the house, and the work was undertaken with the then owner’s consent. 
The house has since been sold, and, in 2014, the current owner of the house wished to sell the 
painting, but was prevented from doing so by Damien Hirst’s company, which alleged that 
the work may only be sold by the person who possessed the certificate of authenticity issued 
with the art work. The company, Science Ltd. is quoted as stating “The ownership of a wall 
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painting in the series titled Wall Spots always resides with the owner of the Wall Spots signed 
certificate, which accompanies the art work”28 
Here the certificate certifies ownership. Someone being in possession of the painted 
wall surface without the certificate does not have any entitlement to the work.”29 In Hirst’s 
case therefore, ownership is characterized not by the elements of possession and control that 
are usually the markers of ownership, but rather by documentation, thus emulating the 
approach taken in land law, where, as a result of the Land Registration Act 2002 in particular, 
ownership is evidenced more by registration than conduct. The validity of such an approach 
in relation to things other than land, vehicles and shares (where ownership by registration has 
already been legitimated by law) will depend on how buyers respond to Science Ltd.’s 
approach. Some buyers will choose not to buy the wall without the certificate on the basis 
that that which is acquired is worthless – especially if, as Science Ltd alleges, without the 
certificate, the work cannot be authenticated as a genuine Hirst.30 Without a buyer of course, 
the painting cannot be sold, and therefore the requirement for a certificate of authenticity 
does restrict the transfer ownership and the owner’s opportunity for commercial gain. Such 
an approach would prevent a work such as Spy Booth from being removed from its location, 
but would not prevent the owner from painting over it. Furthermore if a painting at a 
particular address is known to be by a well-known artist such as Hirst or Bansky, a buyer may 
choose to pay for that value-added irrespective of whether the certificate of authenticity is 
                                                          
28 BBC “Row over sale of Hirst spot painting in London house.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-
28291036 14 July, 2014. Site accessed June 5 2015. 
29 Ibid. 
30 The Daily Telegraph “Spot of bother over Damien Hirst wall art painting.” June 5, 2015. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/10963754/Spot-of-bother-over-Damien-Hirst-wall-art-painting.html 
Site accessed 5 June 2015.  
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transferred, because he or she is able to adduce other evidence to confirm whether or not the 
work is by a well-known artist. 
 
Common wealth 
A third possibility is that public art could accrue to the common wealth – not belonging to 
any one person but being equivalent to a public space or part of the environment. Again this 
is problematic in terms of the fact that a transfer of ownership of the wall is imposed on the 
owners of 159 Fairview Road without the owners’ consent. Furthermore, in relation to the 
notion of common property (common land, public highways and access to the countryside) 
the dominant approach has been to use the concept of licence whereby the public user is 
expressly or impliedly given permission to access the space. The notion of commonality is 
therefore superimposed on the title of the owner, and thus the concept of ownership remains 
core to the regulation of the space.  
 What we see therefore is that the law’s approach to street art relies on privatisation. 
The private owner’s rights are the most important both in order to ensure the protection and 
the preservation of street art, and even where public law intervenes it does so in order to 
identify the roles and responsibilities of the owner of the surface upon which the art is 
painted. This approach would seem to differ very significantly from the attitudes expressed 
by makers of street art, who often consider that the law’s responsible owner approach 
misunderstands in a fundamental way the purpose of street art. Scholars such as Sherwin31 
would argue that this failure arises because of the law’s failure to understand visual art, and 
                                                          
31 R K Sherwin. ‘Visual jurisprudence.’ (2012) 57 New York Law School Law Review 11. 
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that it is the law’s lack of visual literacy that causes this disjuncture. If lawyers had a better 
understanding of art, he argues, art would be better protected.  What follows therefore is an 
analysis of how street artists view street art and why this differs from the legal approach. 
 
11. Graffiti artists and law 
The attitudes of artists towards graffiti art are rather more nuanced than the approach taken 
by the law. The views of graffiti and street artists towards the law are as diverse as the work 
they create. Therefore, although the law’s relationship with art is characterized in terms of 
ownership – the artist owns the idea, and its physical manifestation becomes something that 
is owned by a landowner, and which may be sold, street artists have more diverse views 
regarding the nature of their work and whether the law ought to protect it. Although some 
artists express no strong view as to the destination of their work once it has been made, 
perceiving it to be something that may be claimed by whoever wishes to have it,32 others 
view mural art as being a way of challenging accepted concepts of ownership. In other words, 
to highlight that by trying to fit art into the law’s constraints, the law’s narrowness of 
approach and its maintenance of social order predicated on monetary wealth as its catalyst is 
emphasized. Their response to the law therefore is to object to their work being used by 
others for financial gain, and to object to the fact that once their work has been reduced to 
ownership it ceases to be for the public good. Writing in 2006 for example, Banksy explains 
that;  
 
                                                          
32 LW Rabine,  ‘”These walls belong to everybody.” The graffiti art movement in Dakar. (2014) 14(3) African 
Studies Quarterly 89. 
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Graffiti art is not the lowest form of art…it’s actually one of the most honest forms of 
art available. There is no elitism or hype, it exhibits on the best walls a town has to 
offer and nobody is put off by the price of admission.33 
 
Other street artists34 argue that the law’s approach is overly individualistic – it 
emphasises the rights of the individual, and therefore perceive graffiti art to be a way of re-
emphasising the collective ownership of public space. People are part of that place, and 
therefore by creating something that everyone can experience, they are seeking to draw 
attention to the fact that they are part of a wider community of diverse people. Accordingly, 
by challenging the homogeneity35 that the law enforces, some graffeurs artists argue that they 
are increasing the acceptance of diversity. Others on the other hand point to a lack of 
diversity in the attitudes of graffiti artists – there may be diversity in terms of culture, but the 
rebelliousness required to make street art often means that those who find themselves more 
likely to be condemned and punished for their work find that there is less encouragement for 
them to become graffeurs.36 The difference between the legal approach and the artistic 
approach is therefore one where the law emphasizes the notion of community as being an 
obligation not to offend against other people and their property, the notion of graffiti art 
among some graffeurs is to make people feel part of the community. Artists therefore argue 
that it is an intrinsic part of their work to challenge the notion that something that was made 
without permission can enhance rather than damage an area.  
                                                          
33 Banksy Wall and Peace. (Century, London, 2006). 
34 LM Visconti, JF Sherry, S Borghini and L Anderson ‘Street Art, Sweet art? Reclaiming the public in public 
place. (2010) 37(3) Journal of Consumer Research 511. 
35 A Moors. ‘Niqabitch and Princess Hijab: Niqab activism, satire and street art.’ (2011) Islam in Europe  128. 
36 LW Rabine,  ‘”These walls belong to everybody.” The graffiti art movement in Dakar. (2014) 14(3) African 
Studies Quarterly 89.  
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Graffiti art is also said to blur the distinction between public and private spaces, and 
argue that the public has a greater interest in the outside wall of a building than the person 
who occupies the inside. Despite these noble assertions by graffiti artists, it must be 
remembered that graffiti artists may have as much of an exclusive world view as lawyers, and 
the objectives of graffiti art may alienate outsiders just as much as the law is perceived to do 
– it is for example felt to be an aspect of youth culture and hiphop culture that others may feel 
excluded from.37 Graffiti art may be emblematic of values such as a person’s right to damage 
something that another has tended and cared for, and therefore, what may be touted as a 
challenge to restrictive norms may mask a more individualistic intention to assert that the 
painter’s right to paint is more valued than the wall owner’s right to own an undecorated 
expanse of wall. Watson38 explains:  
Most graffiti involves damage to privately owned buildings and vehicles. It can lead 
to increased insurance premiums. Expenditure on wall coatings, cleaning and 
security is likely to rise. It should also be noted that the removal of graffiti from stone, 
brick and wood is often a difficult process. It can cause more damage to historical 
buildings than the graffiti itself. This is a major (and growing) problem in tourist 
centres such as London and Bath. 
The indirect costs of graffiti are more difficult to assess. If property owners are 
unwilling to remove graffiti from their homes and business premises, property values 
will tend to fall. 
                                                          
37 Watson, M. (2004) ‘Graffiti: popular art, anti-social behaviour or criminal damage?’ 168 Justice of the Peace 
668. 
38 Watson, M. (2004) ‘Graffiti: popular art, anti-social behaviour or criminal damage?’ 168 Justice of the Peace 
668. 
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This is particularly relevant when we distinguish artistic murals from forms of graffiti 
that are less acceptable, either because the graffiti comprises political or offensive slogans, 
tagging one’s person’s property with the name of another, or even advertising.39  
Secondly, street art is often made precisely because it is transgressive. It is the 
dangerous and ephemeral character of the law that makes it valuable – street art acquires its 
status precisely because there is a real danger that it will be defaced or removed, or that the 
maker will be caught and punished. The risk that the artist will be caught, or, alternatively 
that the artwork is removed is integral to its artistry, as Bengtson and Arvidsson emphasize – 
it is the ephemerality that makes the art.40  
Street art therefore needs the law in order to exist, because, without the law’s 
objection, there would be no impetus to create the artwork. Also despite the communitarian 
and edifying objectives of graffiti art, an appeal to the law is nevertheless likely to be made in 
order to protect the artwork as a matter of intellectual property. Furthermore, it is the 
intervention of the law in terms of protecting the work that often serves to validate its 
credentials as art, and whatever the protestations to the contrary, the artist is unlikely to be 
able to state that this is not a positive thing for their practice as an artist.  
Also, the law responds to art. Street art shows us the gaps in the law, such as the law’s 
inability to delineate the distinction between the public and the private that Dahlberg41  
identifies. In order to class as art therefore artists such as Banksy must break the law, and 
                                                          
39 Watson, M. (2005) ‘Dealing with organized environmental crime.’169 Justice of the Peace 931. 
40 P. Bengtsen and M. Arvisson. ‘Spatial Justice and Street Art.’ (2014) 15 Navein Reet: Nordic Journal of Law 
and Social Research 117. 
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take the risk that their work may be removed, and they may be punished for making it. 
Regulation and protection by the law therefore diminishes the artistic value because there is 
no longer any risk that it could disappear as quickly as it appeared. As Young 42 explains if 
the law protects graffiti art, graffiti artists will no longer wish to make graffiti art because it is 
no longer transgressive – it is art with permission, whereupon the artist may as well commit 
his or her work to canvas. The law must fail to appreciate art therefore in order for art to 
exist.  
However, art must also challenge the law. Manderson for example argues that law and 
art approach the world from fundamentally different directions: 
 
Images have a density to them…their non-linearity makes them a particularly 
appropriate means of communicating paradoxical, ambiguous, or double-edged 
ideas. Writing, particularly academic or legal writing privileges and perhaps 
demands the communication of a single well-organized logic.43 
Bengtsen and Arvidsson44 therefore argue that graffiti and other forms of street art do not 
simply break the law, they serve to remind the law that it needs to intervene. Graffiti art may 
therefore be seen as a call to law rather than a rejection of the law.   
 
                                                          
42 A. Young,   ‘Criminal images: the affective judgment of graffiti and street art.’ (2009) 8(3) Crime Media 
Culture 297-314. 
43 Manderson, D. ‘Law of the Image and Image of the Law.’ (2012) 57 New York Law School Law Review 153 
at p155 
44 P. Bengtsen and M. Arvisson. ‘Spatial Justice and Street Art.’ (2014) 15 Navein Reet: Nordic Journal of Law 
and Social Research 117 at p123. 
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12. Conclusion 
The starting point for this article was that the law has failed to prevent the commodification 
of Spy Booth and that it has failed to protect it from damage. Yet as we have seen, the threat 
of the law and the failure of the law provides the impetus for the artwork. Can the law then be 
said to fail? The fact that Spy Booth has been allowed to remain in public view on a wall in 
Cheltenham is precisely because it has received the approval and the endorsement of the law. 
It has remained where it is because the owners of 159 Fairview Road have not objected to 
their wall being used as a surface upon which to make a work of art. It has remained where it 
is because the local authority chose to accept, and not to take enforcement action in relation 
to what clearly amounts to an unauthorized alteration of an already listed building. It also 
remains in its current location because Cheltenham Borough Council have chosen to list Spy 
Booth as a protected location. Accordingly, we conclude that law not only regulates by also 
has a valuable role in retrospectively endorsing transgression. Bengtsen and Arvisson 
characterise this not as a failure of the law, but the law consciously withdrawing from 
involvement.45 This has important implications in terms of the law’s status. Although 
‘…graffiti threatens…the sense of ordered style, the aesthetic of authority that is intertwined 
with them.’ the law feels the need to reassert authority, and it does so by the retrospective 
endorsement of legal art – as Ehrenfeucht46 explains: 
 
                                                          
45 P. Bengtsen and M. Arvisson. ‘Spatial Justice and Street Art.’ (2014) 15 Navein Reet: Nordic Journal of Law 
and Social Research 117 at p124. 
46 Ehrenfeucht, R. (2014) ‘Art, public spaces and private property along the streets of New Orleans.’ 35(7) 
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Bringing graffiti into galleries nevertheless displaced and transformed the work, 
while the process of gaining legitimacy also served to control the artists. 
 
 Once it does so, the law wins. It is in control, not the graffiti artists and the graffiti lovers. 
The law asserts its authority and transgressive art is tamed. Ultimately he law does therefore 
succeed, but this success is a qualified success. It succeeds because its narrowness provides a 
raison d’être for graffiti art to be made. It succeeds because it allows graffiti art to be 
ephemeral, precious. It succeeds because it allows that which is recognized as art to inhabit 
the public space. It endorses the status of paintwork as art. For some, it may be said to be 
successful because it controls behaviour – deterring many from becoming graffeurs, and 
threatening those that do undertake the practice with punishment and the eradication of their 
work. It may be said to be successful because it undermines the countercultural artistic 
statement by endorsing the mainstreaming of the artwork, thus again reiterating the fact that 
the law’s aim is ultimately control. Yet by the same measures, the law does not succeed. Its 
protection of art is inadequate, and few are able to defend it from privatisation and damage. It 
deters many artists and silences the viewpoint that does not receive popular endorsement. It 
encourages a dialogue with those who have little to lose and much to gain from transgression.  
 
 
